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ABSTRACT
This paper studies monetary policy in a model where output fluctuations are caused by shocks to public
beliefs on the economy's fundamentals. I ask whether monetary policy can offset the effect of these
shocks and whether this offsetting is socially desirable. I consider an environment with dispersed information
and two aggregate shocks: a productivity shock and a "news shock" which affects aggregate beliefs.
Neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they hit the economy.
The main results are: (1) despite the lack of superior information an appropriate monetary policy rule
can change the economy's response to the two shocks; (2) monetary policy can achieve full aggregate
stabilization, that is, it can induce a path for aggregate output that is identical to that which would
arise under full information; (3) however, full aggregate stabilization is typically not optimal. The
fact that monetary policy can tackle the two shocks separately is due to two crucial ingredients. First,
agents are forward looking. Second, current fundamental shocks will become public information in
the future and the central bank will be able to respond to them at that time. By announcing its response
to future information, the central bank can influence the expected real interest rate faced by agents
with different beliefs and, thus, induce an optimal use of the information dispersed in the economy.
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Suppose a central bank observes an unexpected expansion in economic activity. This could
be due to a shift in fundamentals, say an aggregate productivity shock, or to a shift in public
beliefs with no actual change in the economy’s fundamentals. If the central bank could tell
apart the two shocks the optimal response would be simple: accommodate the ﬁrst type of
shock and oﬀset the second. In reality, however, central banks can rarely tell apart these shocks
when they hit the economy. What can the central bank do in this case? What is the optimal
monetary policy response? In this paper, I address these questions in the context of a model
with dispersed information, which allows for a micro-founded treatment of fundamental shocks
and shocks to public beliefs.
The US experience in the second half of the 90s has fueled a rich debate on these issues.
The run up in asset prices has been taken by many as a sign of optimistic expectations on the
presence of widespread technological innovations. In this context, the advice given by diﬀerent
economists has been strongly inﬂuenced by the assumptions made about the ability of the
central bank to identify the economy’s actual fundamentals. Some, e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000)
and Dupor (2002), have attributed to the central bank some form of superior information and
have advocated early intervention to contain an expansion driven by incorrect beliefs. Others,
e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (2001), have emphasized the uncertainty associated with the central
bank’s decisions and have advocated sticking to a simple inﬂation-targeting rule. In this paper,
I explore the idea that, even if the central bank does not have superior information, a policy
rule can be designed to take into account, and partially oﬀset, “aggregate mistakes” by the
private sector regarding the economy’s fundamentals.
I consider an economy where aggregate productivity is subject to unobservable random
shocks. Agents have access to a noisy public signal of aggregate productivity, which summarizes
public news about technological advances, aggregate statistics, and information reﬂected in
stock market prices and other ﬁnancial variables. The noise component in this signal, or “news
shock,” introduces shocks to public beliefs which are uncorrelated with actual productivity
shocks. In addition to the public signal, agents have access to private information regarding
the realized productivity in the sector where they work. Due to cross-sectional heterogeneity,
this information is not suﬃcient to identify the value of the aggregate shock. Therefore, agents
combine public and private sources of information to forecast the aggregate behavior of the
economy. The central bank has only access to public information.
1In this environment, I obtain three main results. First, using a policy rule which responds to
past aggregate shocks, the monetary authority can aﬀect the relative response of the economy
to productivity shocks and news shocks. Second, monetary policy can achieve full aggregate
stabilization, that is, it can induce a path for aggregate output that is identical to that which
would arise under full information. Third, full aggregate stabilization is typically suboptimal
and optimal monetary policy partially accommodates the non-fundamental output ﬂuctuations
due to news.
The fact that monetary policy can tackle the two shocks separately is due to two crucial
ingredients. First, agents are forward looking. Second, productivity shocks are unobservable
when they are realized, but become public knowledge in later periods. At that point, the central
bank can respond to them. By choosing an appropriate policy rule the monetary authority can
then alter the way in which agents respond to private and public information. For example,
the monetary authority can announce that it will increase the nominal price level following an
actual increase in aggregate productivity. Under this policy, agents observing an increase in
productivity in their own sector expect higher inﬂation compared to agents who only observe
a positive public signal. Therefore, they face a lower expected real interest rate and choose to
consume more. I will show that then equilibrium output becomes more responsive to private
information and less to public information. This moderates the economy’s response to news
shocks. This result points to an idea which applies more generally in models with dispersed
information. If future policy is set contingent on variables that are imperfectly observed today,
this can change the agents’ reaction to diﬀerent sources of information, and thus aﬀect the
equilibrium allocation.
In the model presented, the power of policy rules to shape the economy’s response to
diﬀerent shocks is surprisingly strong. Namely, by adopting the appropriate rule the central
bank can support an equilibrium where aggregate output responds one for one to fundamentals
and does not respond at all to the noise in public news. However, such a policy is typically
suboptimal, since it has undesirable consequences in terms of the cross-sectional allocation. In
particular, full stabilization generates an ineﬃcient compression in the distribution of relative
prices. This causes welfare losses that need to be balanced against the welfare gains associated
to smaller aggregate volatility.
In this paper, I am able to derive equilibrium quantities and welfare in closed form. This
is possible thanks to an assumption about the random selection of consumption baskets. In
2particular, I maintain the convenience of a continuum of goods in each basket, while, at the
same time, I allow for baskets that diﬀer from consumer to consumer. This technical solution
may be usefully adapted to other models of information diﬀusion with random matching. Its
main advantage is that it allows to construct models where, each period, an agent interacts
with a large number of agents, and, at the same time, does not fully learn about aggregate
behavior.
A number of recent papers, starting with Woodford (2002) and Sims (2003), have revived
the study of monetary models with imperfect common knowledge, in the tradition of Phelps
(1969) and Lucas (1972).1 In particular, this paper is closely related to Hellwig (2005) and
Adam (2006), who study monetary policy in economies where money supply is imperfectly
observed by the public. In both papers consumers’ decisions are essentially static, as a cash-
in-advance constraint is present and always binding. Therefore, the forward-looking element,
which is crucial in this paper, is absent in their models. In the earlier literature, King (1982)
was the ﬁrst to recognize the power of policy rules in models with imperfect information. He
noticed that “prospective feedback actions” responding to “disturbances that are currently
imperfectly known by agents” can aﬀect real outcomes.2 However, the mechanism in King
(1982) is based on the fact that diﬀerent policy rules change the informational content of
prices. As I will show below, that channel is absent in this paper. Here, policy rules matter
because they aﬀect agents’ incentives to respond to private and public signals.
The paper is also related to the literature on optimal monetary policy with uncertain fun-
damentals, including Aoki (2003), Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2005), and Reis (2003). A
distinctive feature of the environment in this paper is that private agents have access to su-
perior information about fundamentals in their local market but not in the aggregate. In this
case, the monetary policy rule is designed to induce the most eﬃcient use of the informa-
tion scattered across the economy. The presence of dispersed information generates a tension
between aggregate eﬃciency and cross-sectional eﬃciency in the design of an optimal policy
rule.
There is a growing literature on the eﬀect of expectations and news on the business cycle.
In particular, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) and Lorenzoni (2006) show that shocks
1See also Moscarini (2004), Milani (2005), Nimark (2005), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005), Luo (2006),
Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2006). Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006) explore the complementary idea
of lags in informational adjustment as a source of nominal rigidity.
2King (1982), p. 248.
3to expectations about productivity can generate realistic aggregate demand disturbances in
business cycle models with nominal rigidities.3 In Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006)
the monetary authority has full information regarding aggregate shocks and can adjust the
nominal interest rate in such a way so as to essentially oﬀset the eﬀect of the news shock and
replicate the behavior of the corresponding ﬂexible price economy. Moreover, this oﬀsetting
is optimal in their model.4 This leads to the question: are expectations-driven cycles merely
a symptom of a suboptimal monetary regime, or is there some amount of expectations-driven
volatility that survives under optimal monetary policy? This paper addresses this question
in the setup of Lorenzoni (2006) and shows that optimal monetary policy does not eliminate
news-driven business cycles. One may think that this result comes immediately from the
assumption that the monetary authority has limited information. That is, it would seem that
the central bank cannot intervene to bring output towards its “natural” level, given that this
natural level is unknown. The analysis in this paper shows that the argument is subtler.
The monetary authority could eliminate the aggregate eﬀect of news shocks by announcing
an appropriate monetary rule. However, this rule is not optimal due to its undesirable cross-
sectional consequences.
A recent series of papers, starting with Morris and Shin (2002), looks at environments with
imperfect common knowledge, asking whether, from the point of view of social welfare, agents
put too much or too little weight on public signals relative to private signals.5 The model in
this paper has a similar ﬂavor, since, under the wrong monetary policy rule, total output may
indeed respond too much (or too little) to public news. An interesting policy question that
has been addressed in this literature is what are the welfare consequences of public releases of
information. Morris and Shin (2002) obtain the paradoxical result that, in a simple coordina-
tion game, making a public signal available to the players may be detrimental for welfare. This
result has started a lively debate on the merits of transparency about macroeconomic policy.6
Using my model, I can address the related question whether better information about macro-
economic fundamentals is welfare improving. Here, a number of issues open up, regarding
aggregate and cross-sectional eﬃciency. First, it is true that an increase in the precision of the
3See Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) for ﬂexible price models of cycles driven
by news about future productivity.
4See Appendix B in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006).
5See Angeletos and Pavan (2005), Hellwig (2005), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2006), Angeletos, Lorenzoni and
Pavan (2007), Amador and Weill (2007).
6See Amato, Morris and Shin (2002), Svensson (2005), Hellwig (2005), Morris and Shin (2005).
4public signal may have negative welfare consequences, because it increases the response of the
economy to news and, thus, may increase output gap volatility.7 In Section 5, I show that, for
a realistic choice of parameters, there is a hump-shaped relation between the precision of the
public signal and output gap volatility. Second, a more precise public signal not only has ef-
fects on the output gap, but also on the cross-sectional allocation. As agents have more precise
information on average productivity, they can set relative prices that are more responsive to
their idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, a more precise public signal is welfare improving because
it allows a more eﬃcient allocation of consumption and labor eﬀort across sectors. What is the
total welfare eﬀect of increasing the precision of the public signal? In the examples considered,
using realistic parameter values, the cross-sectional eﬀect dominates and a more precise public
signal increases total welfare. Therefore, the model implications are, overall, pro-transparency.
The model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, I characterize rational expectations
equilibria under diﬀerent monetary policy rules, show how the policy rule aﬀects the real allo-
cation, and show that full aggregate stabilization is feasible. In Section 4, I derive the welfare
implications of diﬀerent monetary policy rules and I show that full aggregate stabilization is
typically suboptimal. In Section 5, I consider the model implications for transparency. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
I consider a dynamic model of monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz with heterogeneous
productivity shocks and imperfect information regarding aggregate shocks. Prices are set at
the beginning of each period, but are, otherwise, ﬂexible.
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households uniformly distributed on the unit interval
[0,1]. Each household i is made of two agents: a consumer and a producer who is specialized
in the production of good i. Preferences are represented by the utility function:
E
"
∞ X
t=0
βt
µ
lnCit −
1
1+η
N
1+η
it
¶#
,
where Cit is a consumption index, described below, and Nit is the labor eﬀort of producer i.
Each period t,c o n s u m e ri consumes a random sample of the goods produced in the economy,
7Here the output gap is measured with respect to the equilibrium under full information.
5given by the set Jit ⊂ [0,1], which will be described in detail below. The consumption index
Cit is given by the CES aggregate:
Cit =
µZ
Jit
C
σ−1
σ
ijt dj
¶ σ
σ−1
, (1)
with σ>1,w h e r eCijt is consumption of good j by consumer i in period t.
The production function for good i is
Yit = AitNit.
Productivity is household-speciﬁc and labor is immobile across households. The productivity
parameters Ait are the fundamental source of uncertainty in the model. Let ait denote the log
of individual productivity, ait =l n( Ait). Individual productivity at date t has an aggregate
component, at, and an idiosyncratic component,  it,
ait = at +  it,
with
R 1
0  itdi =0 . Aggregate productivity at follows the random walk
at = at−1 + θt.
At the beginning of period t, all households observe the value of aggregate productivity
in the previous period, at−1. Next, the shocks θt and  it are realized. Agents in household i
cannot observe θt and  it separately, they only observe the sum of the two, i.e., the individual
productivity innovation
θit = θt +  it.
Moreover, all agents observe a noisy public signal of the aggregate innovation
st = θt + et.
The random variables θt,e t,  it are independent, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed
with zero mean and variances
¡
σ2
θ,σ2
e,σ2
 
¢
.
Summarizing, there are two aggregate shocks: the productivity shock θt and the shock et,
representing noise in the public signal. The latter will be called “news shock.” Both shocks
are unobservable during period t, but are fully revealed at the beginning of t +1 ,w h e nat is
observed. The public history of the economy at the beginning of date t is denoted by
ht ≡ hθt−1,e t−1,θt−2,e t−2,...i.
6L e tm et u r nn o wt ot h es e tJit, the consumption basket of consumer i.T h e s e t Jit is
randomly selected each period choosing goods with correlated productivity shocks. In this
way, even though each consumer consumes a large number of goods (a continuum), the law of
large numbers does not apply, and consumption baskets diﬀer across consumers. This limits
consumers’ ability to infer the underlying aggregate state of the economy from price observa-
tions. In the appendix, I give a full description of the matching process between consumers
and producers. Here, I summarize the properties of the consumption baskets that arise from
that process. Each consumer receives a “sampling shock” vit (unobserved by the consumer
himself) and the goods in Jit are selected so that the distribution of the shocks  jt for j ∈ Jit
is normal with mean vit and variance σ2
 . The sampling shocks vit are normally distributed
across consumers, with zero mean and variance σ2
v. They are independent of all other shocks
and satisfy
R 1
0 vitdi =0 . To ensure consistency of the matching process the variances σ2
v,σ2
 
and σ2
  have to satisfy σ2
v + σ2
  = σ2
 . Let me introduce here the parameter γ,g i v e nb y
γ =
σ2
v
σ2
 
,
which reﬂects the degree of heterogeneity in consumption baskets. The limit case γ =0corre-
sponds to the case where all consumers consume the same representative sample of goods. The
limit case γ =1arises when a consumer’s basket is made of goods with identical productivity
shocks. Let θit denote the average productivity innovation in the basket of consumer i,
θit = θt + vit.
2.2 Trading, ﬁnancial markets and monetary policy
The central bank acts as an account keeper for the agents in the economy. Each household
holds a checking account, denominated in dollars, directly with the central bank. The account
is debited whenever the consumer makes a purchase and credited whenever the producer makes
a sale. Households start with a balance M>0 at date 0. Their balance must be non-negative
at the beginning of each period, but it is allowed to go negative within the period. At the
beginning of period t the central bank pays the (gross) interest rate Rt−1 on nominal balances
carried over from last period. The presence of interest-paying money balances allows me to
study a monetary environment where money and nominal bonds are perfect substitutes. This
modeling choice is made for simplicity, as it allows a closed-form derivation of equilibrium
7(t,0) 
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Figure 1: Timeline.
quantities and welfare.8 The only other policy instrument available is a proportional subsidy
τ on sales, which is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax Tt. As usual in the literature, the subsidy will
be used to eliminate the distortions due to monopolistic competition.
To describe the trading environment, it is convenient to divide each period t in three
stages, (t,0), (t,I), and (t,II). In stage (t,0), the central bank sets the interest rate Rt for
the current period, households observe at−1 and trade state-contingent claims on a centralized
ﬁnancial market. These claims will be paid at the beginning of (t +1 ,0).I n s t a g e (t,I),a l l
aggregate and individual shocks are realized, producer i sets the dollar price of good i, Pit,a n d
stands ready to deliver any quantity of good i at that price. Finally, in stage (t,II),c o n s u m e ri
observes the prices of the goods in his consumption basket, {Pjt}j∈Jit, chooses his consumption
vector, {Cijt}j∈Jit, and buys Cijt from each producer j ∈ Jit. In this stage, consumer i and
producer i are spatially separated, so the consumer does not observes the production of good
i when choosing his consumption vector. Figure 1 summarizes the events taking place during
period t.
Agents do not have access to the ﬁnancial market in (t,I) and (t,II).T h e r e f o r e , g i v e n
the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, households will generally end up with diﬀerent end-
of-period nominal balances. However, households can fully smooth these shocks by trading
8For an alternative approach, see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), who start from a model with money in the
utility function (and zero interest on cash balances) and look at the “cashless” limit to derive welfare in closed
form.
8contingent claims in stage (t,0) which are paid at the beginning of (t +1 ,0).T h i s i m p l i e s
that the nominal balances Mit will be constant and equal to M in equilibrium.9 In this way, I
can eliminate the distribution of wealth from the state variables of the problem, which greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis.10
Let Zit (ωit) denote the state-contingent claims purchased by household i in (t,0),w h e r e
ωit ≡ { it,v it,θt}. The price of these claims is denoted by qt (ωit).L e t Mit−1 denote the
nominal balances of household i at the beginning of period t. The household budget constraint
in period t is, then,
Mit+1 = Rt−1Mit +( 1+τ)PitYit −
Z
Jit
PjtCijtdj −
Z
Zit (˜ ωit)qt (˜ ωit)d˜ ωt − Tt + Zit (ωit).
Nominal bonds are in zero net supply, and I omit them for simplicity. It is easy to show that
in all the equilibria studied below their price is 1/Rt.
The behavior of the monetary authority is described by a policy rule. For the deﬁnition of
t h ep o l i c yr u l ei ti su s e f u lt od e ﬁne an aggregate price index. For ease of notation, it will be
convenient to use the geometric mean11
Pt ≡ exp
µZ 1
0
lnPitdi
¶
. (2)
In period (t,0), the central bank sets Rt based on the public history ht and the past realizations
of the price index. A monetary policy rule is described by the map R,w h i c hg i v e sRt =
R(ht,P t−1,P t−2,...). Allowing the monetary policy to condition Rt on the public signal st
would not alter any of the results.
Finally, the supply of nominal balances is kept constant at M. Therefore, the government
budget balance condition is
Tt =( Rt − 1)M + τ
Z 1
0
PitYitdi.
2.3 Equilibrium
Household behavior is captured by three functions, Z, P and C.T h e ﬁrst gives the optimal
holdings of state-contingent claims as a function of the initial balances Mit and of the public
9Note that the nominal balances Mit are computed after the claims from period t − 1 have been settled.
10The use of this type of assumption to simplify the study of monetary models goes back to Lucas (1990).
11An alternative price index is ˆ Pt ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−σ
it di
´ 1
1−σ . All results stated for Pt hold for ˆ Pt, modulo a
multiplicative constant.
9history ht, Zit+1 (ωit)=Z (ωit;Mit,h t). The second gives the optimal price for household i,a s
a function of the same variables plus the current realization of individual productivity and of the
public signal, Pit = P (Mit−1,h t,a it,s t). The third gives optimal consumption as a function of
the same variables plus the observed price vector, Cit = C
³
Mit,h t,a it,s t,{Pij}j∈Jit
´
.B e f o r e
deﬁning an equilibrium, I need to introduce two more objects. The map ∆(ht) gives the
distribution of nominal balances Mit for each public history ht,a n dq (ωit;ht) denotes the
price of a ωit-contingent claim in period (t,0) after public history ht.
A symmetric rational expectations equilibrium under the policy rule R i sg i v e nb ya na r -
ray of functions {Z,P,C,∆,q} that satisfy three conditions: optimality, market clearing and
consistency. Optimality requires that the individual rules Z,P and C are optimal for the in-
dividual household, taking as given the policy rule R, the distributions ∆, and the fact that
all other households follow Z,P,C. Market clearing requires that the goods markets and the
market for state-contingent claims clear for each ht. Consistency requires that the dynamics of
the distribution of nominal balances, described by ∆, are consistent with individual decision
rules.
3 Policy Rules and Expectations
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium behavior of output and prices, and show how it
is aﬀected by the choice of a monetary policy rule.
3.1 Linear equilibria under a price targeting rule
Given the form of the agents’ preferences and the normality of the shocks, it is possible to
study linear rational expectations equilibria in closed form. To describe monetary policy I
concentrate on a speciﬁc type of interest rate rule, representing a form of price level targeting.
I will show later that this is without loss of generality. The nominal interest rate is set as
follows,12
rt+1 = ρ + ξ (pt − p∗
t), (3)
where pt is the price index deﬁn e di n( 2 ) ,p∗
t is the state-contingent target
p∗
t = µat−1 + φθθt + φsst, (4)
12Throughout the paper, I adopt the convention that a lowercase variable denotes the natural logarithm of
the corresponding uppercase variable.
10and ρ,ξ,µ,φθ, and φs are constant parameters. Under this rule, I look at equilibria where
individual prices and consumption are given by
pit = µat−1 + φθθit + φsst, (5)
cit = ψ0 + at−1 + ψ θit + ψvθit + ψsst, (6)
where ψ0,ψ ,ψv and ψs are constant coeﬃcients.13 Due to the presence of complete ﬁnancial
markets the equilibrium distribution of nominal balances is degenerate, with balances equal to
M for all households at the beginning of each period. In equilibrium, the aggregate price level
is always equal to the target p∗
t and the nominal interest rate is constant and equal to ρ.
An equilibrium of the form (5)-(6) exists if the parameters of the policy rule satisfy certain
restrictions. In particular, next proposition shows that the choice of the parameter µ in (4)
uniquely pins down ρ,φθ, and φs in the policy rule and all the remaining coeﬃcients of the
linear equilibrium. The proofs of this and of all following results are in the appendix. Let φ
and ψ denote the vectors {φθ,φ s} and {ψ0,ψ ,ψv,ψs}.
Proposition 1 For every µ ∈ R there exists a unique vector {φ,ψ} a n dau n i q u eρ such that
(5)-(6) constitute a rational expectations equilibrium under the monetary policy rule (3)-(4)
for any value of ξ.I fξ>1 the equilibrium is locally determinate.
Equilibrium behavior can be described as follows. At the beginning of period t, the mon-
etary authority observes at−1 and announces a menu of price targets p∗
t conditional on the
current realization of the aggregate shock θt, which it cannot currently observe. During trad-
ing, each agent i sets his price and consumption responding to the variables in his information
set. At the beginning of period t +1 , the central bank observes the realized price level pt
and the aggregate shock θt, and checks whether aggregate behavior did conform to the target
p∗
t. As this is always true in equilibrium, the central bank leaves the nominal interest rate
unchanged at ρ.
Aggregate output is measured by the index14
yt ≡
Z 1
0
citdi.
13Recall that θit is the average productivity innovation for the goods in the basket of consumer i.Iw i l lc l a r i f y
later why this variable enters (6).
14An alternative quantity index is
ˆ yt =l o g
R 1
0 PitYitdi
Pt
.
All results stated for yt also hold for ˆ yt, modulo a constant term.
11The equilibrium coeﬃcients ψ determine the response of aggregate output to aggregate shocks.
Summing (6) across agents, and recalling that st = θt + et,g i v e s
yt = ψ0 + at−1 + ψθθt + ψs (θt + et), (7)
where ψθ ≡ ψ  +ψv.T h eﬁrst question raised in the introduction can now be stated in formal
terms. How does the choice of a policy rule, µ,a ﬀects the equilibrium coeﬃcients ψθ and ψs,
which determine the response of output to fundamental and news shocks? The rest of this
section addresses this question.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify why the consumption of agent i,i n( 6 ) ,
depends on θit. If all producers follow (5) then the population of log prices observed by
consumer i follows a normal distribution with mean µat−1 + φθθit + φsst and variance φ2
θσ2
 .
Given that consumer i observes the public signal st, he can back out θit from the mean of
this distribution, as long as φθ 6=0 . Two conclusions follow: (i) knowing θit one can derive
the entire distribution of prices faced by consumer i,a n d( i i )θit is a suﬃcient statistic for all
the information regarding θt contained in the price vector {Pjt}j∈Jit (if φθ 6=0 ). The second
conclusion is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If prices are given by (5) and φθ 6=0then the information of consumer i regarding
the current shock θt is summarized by the three independent signals st,θit and θit.
A useful consequence of this lemma is that in all linear equilibria with price targeting the
informational content of prices is the same and is independent of the monetary policy rule
chosen, except in the knife-edge case φθ =0in which prices are uninformative.
3.2 Monetary policy and real allocations
L e tm et u r nn o wt ot h ee ﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policy rules, parametrized by µ,o nt h e
real equilibrium allocation. Let me begin with the case of full information, which arises when
st is a noiseless signal, σ2
e =0 .
Proposition 2 With full information the real allocation in all linear equilibria with price
targeting is constant and independent of µ. Aggregate output satisﬁes
yt = ψ0 + at.
12This proposition gives a neutrality result: under full information the choice of the policy
rule is immaterial for the determination of the real allocation.15 Furthermore, this proposition
gives a characterization of aggregate dynamics: under full information aggregate output moves
one for one with aggregate productivity at. The value of the constant ψ0 depends on the subsidy
τ. In particular, it is possible to ﬁnd a subsidy τ∗ that replicates the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n ,t h a t
is, the allocation that would be chosen by a social planner maximizing the ex ante expected
utility of the representative household under full information.16 For this reason, I will use the
full-information equilibrium as a benchmark in the rest of the analysis.
When agents have imperfect information, the choice of the policy rule is no longer neutral,
a ss h o w ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 3 With imperfect information (σ2
θ > 0,σ2
e > 0,σ2
  > 0) the real allocation in
a linear equilibrium with price targeting depends on µ.T h e e ﬀects of changing µ on the
equilibrium coeﬃcients {φθ,φ s,ψθ,ψs} are:
∂φθ
∂µ
> 0,
∂φs
∂µ
> 0,
∂ψθ
∂µ
> 0,
∂ψs
∂µ
< 0.
Moreover, ∂ (ψθ + ψs)/∂µ > 0.
The main result of this proposition is that an increase in µ increases the response of
aggregate output to fundamental shocks and reduces its response to news shocks. To shed
light on this result, I will now discuss the way in which the choice of µ aﬀects household
behavior. Consider ﬁrst the optimality condition that determines optimal consumption
cit = Ei,(t,II)
£
cit+1 −
¡
rt − pit+1 + pit
¢¤
,
where Ei,(t,II) [.] denotes the expectation of agent i at date (t,II) and pit denotes the price
index for the consumption basket of consumer i.17 Apart from the fact that price indexes are
consumer-speciﬁc, this is the standard consumer’s Euler equation with iso-elastic preferences,
linking the expected growth rate of consumption to the expected real interest rate.
15See McCallum (1979) for an early neutrality result in a model with pre-set prices.
16See Lemma 4 in the appendix.
17A constant term is omitted in the optimality condition. See (13) in the appendix for the formal deﬁnition
of pit.
13In a linear equilibrium (5)-(6), expected future consumption is given by Ei,(t,II) [cit+1]=
ψ0 + Ei,(t,II) [at] and is independent of the policy rule. The reason why the choice of µ aﬀects
consumption is that it aﬀects the expected real interest rate
Ei,(t,II)
£
rt − pit+1 + pit
¤
= ρ − µat−1 − µEi,(t,II) [θt]+pit.
For a given pit,a ni n c r e a s ei nµ increases the response of consumers’ demand both to a
fundamental shock and to a news shock, given that both shocks increase the expectation
Ei,(t,II) [θt], and, thus, the expected future price level. This would seem to suggest that an
increase in µ makes output more sensitive to both shocks. However, in general equilibrium,
t h ec h o i c eo fµ also aﬀects the response of the current prices in pit. Therefore, to understand
the full eﬀect of monetary policy, I need to turn to the pricing conditions.
The optimality condition for pit takes the form
pit =
η
1+ση
¡
Ei,(t,I) [dit] − ait
¢
+
1
1+ση
¡
Ei,(t,I) [pit + cit] − ait
¢
, (8)
where dit is the demand index
dit =
Z
j∈ ˜ Jit
¡
cjt + σpjt
¢
dj,
capturing the intercept of the demand curve faced by producer i.18 After a fundamental or a
news shock, producers expect consumers’ demand to increase more if µ is larger, following the
reasoning above. As a consequence, they tend to set higher prices. Therefore, an increase in µ
magniﬁes the response of prices to both shocks.19 This is conﬁrmed by the results for φθ and
φs in Proposition 3.
Let me go back now to the response of the expected real interest rate. Summing up the
discussion so far, the net eﬀect on the expected real rate depends on the relative strength of
two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect, by which a higher µ increases the expected future price level, and
an indirect eﬀect, by which a higher µ increases current prices. Proposition 3 shows that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates in the case of a fundamental shock, while the second eﬀect dominates in
t h ec a s eo fan e w ss h o c k .T h er e a s o nf o rt h i sd i ﬀerence is the following. After a positive news
18The demand for good i is
Yit = DitP
−σ
it .
See Lemma 3 in the appendix for the full derivation of Dit. Constant terms are omitted both in (8) and in the
expression for dit.
19This discussion focuses on the eﬀect working through Ei,(t,I) [dit] in (8). It is possible to show that the eﬀect
working through Ei,(t,I) [pit + cit] goes in the same direction.
14shock producers tend to over-estimate the demand increase, given that they update upward
their beliefs on θt,w h i l eθt has not changed. If, instead, a positive productivity shock hits,
producers tend to under-estimate the demand increase, given that they only have access to
noisy observations of θt. Therefore, an increase in µ leads to higher prices in response to both
shocks, but the increase is sharper (relative to the actual demand increase) after a news shock.
This discussion also helps to clarify the mechanism behind the neutrality result in Propo-
sition 2. In the case of full information producers perfectly anticipate any aggregate change
in demand, i.e., they never over-estimate or under-estimate demand conditions. This accounts
for the fact that the response of prices at date t fully oﬀsets the eﬀects of µ on future prices,
and the real rate is unchanged.
The key assumptions behind the non-neutrality result are that agents have dispersed in-
formation regarding θt, that they are forward-looking, and that the value of θt will be fully
revealed in the future. The central bank can then aﬀect individual behavior by announcing
that the price target p∗
t+1 will respond to θt. If the price target p∗
t+1 was set as a function
of variables that are common knowledge at date t,e . g .st, this would have no eﬀects on the
real allocation at date t. In this case, the change in demand would be perfectly forecasted by
producers, leading to a neutrality result analogous to the one derived in the case of perfect
information.
To conclude this discussion, let me remark that the parameters {φθ,φ s,ψθ,ψs} also aﬀect
the sensitivity of individual consumption and prices to idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, the
choice of µ has implications not only for the aggregate responses, but also for the cross-sectional
distribution of consumption and relative prices. This observation will turn out to be crucial in
evaluating the welfare consequences of diﬀerent monetary rules.
3.3 Full aggregate stabilization
Let me now compare aggregate output dynamics under full information and under imperfect
information. Recall that, with full information, aggregate output responds one for one to
productivity shocks. Inspecting (7) shows that the same property holds under imperfect infor-
m a t i o ni fa n do n l yi fψs =0and ψθ =1 . To achieve a path for aggregate output that tracks the
changes in the full information benchmark, the central bank has to eliminate the eﬀect of news
shocks and ensure, at the same time, that output responds one for one to fundamental shocks.
Next proposition shows that, even though the monetary authority can only set µ, it can still
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy and Full Aggregate Stabilization
achieve both objectives. This type of policy rule is called “full aggregate stabilization.”
Proposition 4 There exists a monetary policy rule, given by µfs, that achieves full aggregate
stabilization, yt = ψ0 + at.
To illustrate this result Figure 2 shows the equilibrium relation between µ and the para-
meters ψθ and ψs. Consistent with the results in Proposition 3, an increase in µ increases ψθ
and reduces ψs. The surprising result is that the value of µ that sets ψs to zero is the same
that sets ψθ equal to one.
Notice that the value of the constant ψ0 in the equilibrium described in Proposition 4
is, in general, diﬀerent from the one in Proposition 2. However, the subsidy τ can be cho-
sen so as to achieve the same value of ψ0. Therefore, by choosing the right pair (τ,µ) the
monetary authority can perfectly replicate the behavior of aggregate output arising under full
information.
3.4 General policy rules
Let me consider now more general interest rate rules. In particular, consider all the policy
rules under which the equilibrium behavior of prices and consumption is given by
pit = φ0,t + φθ,tθit + φs,tst, (9)
cit = ψ0,t + at−1 + ψ ,tθit + ψv,tθit + ψs,tst, (10)
16where the coeﬃcients φt and ψt are linear functions of ht, that is, of all the variables that
are common knowledge at the beginning of period t. For simplicity, suppose the subsidy τ is
constant over time. The following proposition shows that the real allocation arising in any of
these equilibria can also be achieved under a price targeting rule analogous to (3)-(4).
Proposition 5 For any linear equilibrium of the form (9)-(10) there exists a sequence {ρt,µ t}
such that the same allocation is supported in a linear equilibrium under the policy rule
rt+1 = ρt+1 + ξ (pt − p∗
t),
p∗
t = µtat−1 + φθtθt + φstst.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
4.1 Welfare
Let me turn now to welfare analysis and to the characterization of optimal monetary policy. I
will evaluate the choice of µ by looking at its implications for expected utility in period t
Wt = Et
∙Z 1
0
µ
lnCitdi −
1
1+η
N
1+η
it
¶
di
¸
,
where Et [.] denotes the expectation conditional on the public history ht. In a linear equilibrium
(5)-(6) the only variables that are relevant for consumers’ utility are consumption, cit,a n d
relative prices, pit − pt.20 This implies that the term µat in pt+1 has no eﬀects on welfare in
period t +1 , although, as argued in the previous section, it matters for the real allocation
in period t. This allows me to conduct welfare analysis period-by-period and evaluate the
monetary rule µ by looking at its eﬀects on expected utility in period t. Thanks to log-
normality the welfare measure Wt can be derived analytically.
Lemma 2 Given a linear equilibrium, characterized by the coeﬃcients φ and ψ , consumers’
welfare is equal to
Wt = at−1 + ψ0 −
1
1+η
exp
½
(1 + η)
µ
ψ0 −
1
2
w
¶¾
where
w = −(1 + η)
³
(ψs + ψθ − 1)
2 σ2
θ + ψ2
sσ2
e
´
+ σ (σ − 1)φ2
θσ2
  (11)
−(1 + η)(1+σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
2 σ2
  +
−ψ2
 σ2
  − (ψv + σφθ)
2 γσ2
 
20The distribution of labor supply can be derived from these quantities.
17T h ec h o i c eo ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ea ﬀects the equilibrium allocation both in terms of levels
(captured by the constant term ψ0) and in terms of the economy’s response to aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks (captured by the coeﬃcients φθ,ψ ,ψv, and ψs). However, any level eﬀect
of µ can be oﬀset by adjusting the subsidy τ. Therefore, the optimal value of µ can be found by
looking at its eﬀects on the welfare measure w,d e ﬁn e di n( 1 1 ) ,a ss h o w ni nn e x tp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 6 The optimal monetary policy rule is found by choosing the µ that maximizes
(11), where the relation between µ and the parameters {φθ,ψ ,ψv,ψs} is the one derived in
Proposition 1.
For the sake of interpretation w can be expressed as:
w = −(1 + η)E
h
(yt − ψ0 − at)
2 |at−1
i
+ σ (σ − 1)Va r(pjt|j ∈ Jit) (12)
−(1 + η)Va r(nit) − Va r
³
cjt + σpjt|j ∈ ˜ Jit
´
,
This expression shows that the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy can be split in four parts. The
ﬁrst term in (12) captures the volatility of an aggregate “output gap” measure yt−ψ0−at.T h i s
reﬂects deviations of aggregate output from the path that would arise under full information.21
The remaining three terms capture cross-sectional eﬀects. The second term reﬂects the eﬀect
of dispersion in relative prices on welfare. Note that this term is positive, that is, larger price
dispersion is beneﬁcial in terms of welfare. This is due to the fact that higher price dispersion
reduces the price index Pit for each consumer –since the price index is concave in individual
prices–, and increases consumers’ purchasing power. The third term captures the welfare loss
associated to the dispersion in labor supply across producers. The fourth term captures the
welfare loss due to the dispersion in consumption across consumers, corrected for the diﬀerence
in relative prices faced by diﬀerent consumers.
The fact that higher price dispersion increases welfare might seem at odds with standard
results in the sticky-price literature, where price dispersion is associated to a welfare loss.
However, in standard sticky-price models there are no idiosyncratic productivity shocks, so any
dispersion in relative prices is harmful, since producers have identical marginal costs. Here,
instead, relative price dispersion is beneﬁcial as long as it reﬂects productivity diﬀerences.
Price dispersion that does not reﬂect productivity diﬀerences is still costly, since it determines
greater dispersion in labor supply across producers, as reﬂected in the third term of (12).
21Recall, from the discussion on page 16, that the level of ψ0 is generally diﬀerent with full information and
with imperfect information. The measure E
£
(yt − ψ0 − at)
2 |at−1
¤
disregards this level eﬀect, which, again, is
taken care of by τ.
184.2 Optimal accommodation of news shocks
Having obtained a general characterization of optimal monetary policy, I can turn to the
question: is full aggregate stabilization optimal? That is, should monetary policy completely
eliminate the aggregate demand disturbances driven by news shocks and set ψs =0 ? The next
proposition shows that, typically, full stabilization is suboptimal and optimal monetary policy
involves some degree of accommodation of news shocks.
Proposition 7 If η>0 and γ ∈ (0,1) then full aggregate stabilization is suboptimal and the
optimal monetary policy µo satisﬁes
µo <µ fs.
At the optimal monetary policy news shocks have a positive eﬀe c to na g g r e g a t eo u t p u t
ψo
s > 0.
Full aggregate stabilization is optimal, µo = µfs, if any one of the following conditions is
satisﬁed: (i) η =0 , (ii) γ =0 , (iii) γ =1 .
Full stabilization is only optimal in three special cases. The ﬁrst, η =0 , corresponds to the
case of linear disutility of labor. To interpret the other two cases, recall that the parameter γ
reﬂects how representative is the sample of goods purchased by a given consumer. The limit
case γ =0corresponds to the case where all consumers consume all goods. In this case, prices
are fully revealing and there is full information at the consumption stage. The limit case γ =1
arises when each consumer consumes essentially one type of good. In this case, there is no
asymmetric information among price-setters, since each producer knows all the prices faced by
his consumers. This shows that both asymmetric information among consumers and among
producers are needed to obtain a meaningful trade-oﬀ between aggregate stabilization and
cross-sectional eﬃciency.
To illustrate the result in Proposition 7 I will use a numerical example. The parameters
for the example are in Table 1. The values for σ and η are chosen in the range of values used
in the sticky-price literature. The values for the variances σ2
θ and σ2
  are set conventionally at
1, while I assume that the value of σ2
e is 1/3, implying that the public signal is relatively more
precise than the private signals. For γ Ic h o o s eav a l u eo f0 . 5 .
Figure 3 illustrates how the choice of the monetary policy rule aﬀects the four variance
terms in (12). The ﬁgure identiﬁes the value of µ that achieves full aggregate stabilization,
19σ 7 η 2
σ2
θ 1 σ2
  1
σ2
e 1/3 γ 0.5
Table 1: Parameters for the benchmark example
µfs, and the value corresponding to optimal monetary policy, µo. Panel (a) plots the relation
between µ and aggregate output gap volatility. Not surprisingly, the minimum for this curve
is reached at µfs, that is, at the monetary policy that achieves full aggregate stabilization. In
accordance with Proposition 4, output gap volatility is zero at µfs. Panel (b) shows the eﬀects
of monetary policy on equilibrium price dispersion. In a neighborhood of µfs,a ni n c r e a s e
in µ has the eﬀect of reducing the dispersion of relative prices by reducing the value of |φθ|,
which determines the response of individual prices to individual productivity shocks.22 This
reduction in price dispersion can be interpreted as follows. A household facing a positive
productivity shock, θit > 0, increases its consumption more if µ is larger. As a consequence
the marginal utility of consumption decreases and, at the price-setting stage, household i has
a weaker incentive to lower the relative price of its good, even though its productivity has
increased. Therefore, relative prices respond less to diﬀerences in individual productivities.
Finally, under the parametric assumptions made, an increase in µ tends to reduce the dispersion
of labor supply and consumption. Both eﬀects are depicted in panel (c). Remember that price
dispersion has a positive eﬀect on welfare, while labor supply and consumption dispersion have
negative eﬀects. Therefore, the total eﬀect of an increase in µ in a neighborhood of µfs depends
on the relative strength of the eﬀects depicted in panels (b) and (c).
Figure 4 plots the total welfare function w. It shows that the price-dispersion term dom-
inates and makes the loss function decreasing at µfs. This implies that optimal monetary
policy is characterized by µo <µ fs. Proposition 7 shows that this is a generic property of the
model. Since the relation between ψs and µ is decreasing (from Proposition 3) and ψs is zero
when µ = µfs, it follows that optimal monetary policy entails ψs > 0.
5 Transparency
So far, I have assumed that the source of public information, the signal st, is exogenous
and outside the control of the monetary authority. Suppose, now, that the central bank has
22Lemma 5 in the appendix shows that as long as ψθ ≤ 1 the value of φθ is negative. This, together with
Proposition 3 implies that |φθ| is decreasing in µ,f o rµ ≤ µ
fs.
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Figure 3: The Eﬀects of Monetary Policy on Aggregate Volatility and on Cross-Sectional
Variances
Panel (a): variance of yt − at. Panel (b): variance of pjt for j ∈ Jit. Panel (c): solid line, variance of
nit; dashed line, variance of cjt + σpjt for j ∈ ˜ Jit.
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Figure 5: Precision of Public Information and Output Gap Volatility
some control on the information received by the private sector. For example, it can decide
whether or not to release some aggregate statistics, which would increase the precision of
public information. What are the welfare eﬀects of this decision? To address this question I
look at the eﬀects of changing the precision of the public signal, measured by 1/σ2
e,o nt o t a l
welfare, assuming that the policy rule is set optimally for each level of 1/σ2
e. This exercise
connects this paper to a growing literature on the welfare eﬀects of public information.23
Figure 5 shows the relation between the precision of the public signal and the volatility
of the output gap.24 This relation is non-monotone, increasing for low values of 1/σ2
e and
decreasing for high values. When the signal is very imprecise agents disregard it and the
coeﬃcient ψs in (7) goes to zero. In this case aggregate volatility is low, since there is no
volatility due to the news shock et. When the signal becomes more precise, agents rely more
on the public signal and this, initially, increases aggregate volatility. Therefore, for low values
of 1/σ2
e, more precise public information has a destabilizing eﬀect on the economy. Eventually,
when the signal precision is very large, the economy converges towards the full information
equilibrium and output gap volatility goes to zero.
23See Morris and Shin (2002) and the references in footnotes 5 and 6.
24The latter is measured by E
£
(yt − ψ0 − at)
2 |at−1
¤
. To make the graph easier to read I use a log scale for
1/σ
2
e. The parameters are those in Table 1.
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This ﬁgure, however, is only telling a piece of the story. Figure 6 shows the eﬀect of changing
the signal precision on the total welfare measure w. Recall from (12) that w corresponds to
the sum of aggregate volatility (with a negative sign) and three terms reﬂecting cross-sectional
distortions. Figure 6 shows that, putting together all four terms, welfare is always increasing
in the signal precision.
To understand the diﬀerence between the two graphs notice that, when the public signal
is very imprecise, agents have to use their own individual productivity to estimate aggregate
productivity. This makes them underestimate the idiosyncratic component of their productiv-
ity and leads to a compressed distribution of relative prices. An increase in the signal precision
helps producers set relative prices that reﬂect more closely the underlying productivity diﬀer-
ences. The associated gain in allocative eﬃciency is positive and more than compensates for
the welfare loss due to higher aggregate volatility, which is present at low values of 1/σ2
e.
The notion that more precise information about aggregate variables has important cross-
sectional implications is also highlighted in Hellwig (2005). In that paper there are no idio-
syncratic productivity shocks, so the cross-sectional gain is reﬂected in a reduction in price
dispersion. However, the underlying principle is the same: in both cases a more precise public
signal leads to relative prices more in line with productivity diﬀerentials (which are zero in
23Hellwig (2005)).
The graphs above have been derived under the assumption that monetary policy is set
optimally. However, given the parameters in Table 1, similar outcomes emerge if µ is kept
constant and only the signal precision changes. I have experimented with several parameter
combinations, both adjusting the policy rule and leaving it unchanged, and could not obtain
an example of a welfare-reducing increase in precision. Whether this is a general proposition
or counter-examples can be constructed is an open question for future work.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I have explored the eﬀect of policy rules in a model where information about
macroeconomic fundamentals is dispersed across the economy. The emphasis has been on the
ability of the policy rule to shape the economy’s response to diﬀerent shocks. In particular, the
monetary authority is able to reduce the economy’s response to news shocks by manipulating
agents’ expectations about the real interest rate. The principle behind this result goes beyond
the speciﬁc model used in this paper: by announcing that policy actions will respond to
future information, the monetary authority can aﬀect diﬀerently agents with diﬀerent pieces
of information. In this way, it can change the aggregate response to fundamental and news
shocks. The result that full aggregate stabilization is feasible is clearly more dependent on the
speciﬁc features of the model. Nonetheless, that result is useful in clarifying why eliminating
the eﬀects of news is not optimal. Not necessarily because it is not possible, but because, even
when possible, it is socially costly.
The optimal policy rule used in this paper can be implemented both under commitment
and under discretion. To oﬀset an expansion driven by optimistic beliefs, the central bank
announces that it will make the real interest rate higher if good fundamentals do not mate-
rialize. With ﬂexible prices, this eﬀect is achieved with a jump in the price level between t
and t +1 . As argued in Section 4.1, this jump has no welfare consequences from period t +1
on. Therefore, the central bank has no incentive to deviate from its announced policy. In
economies with sluggish price adjustment, a similar eﬀect could be obtained by a combina-
tion of a price level change and an increase in nominal interest rates. In that case, however,
commitment problems are likely to arise, because both type of interventions have additional
distortionary consequences ex post. The study of models where lack of commitment interferes
with the central bank’s ability to deal with informational shocks seems an interesting area for
24further research.
Finally, in the model presented, the information sets of consumers, producers, and of the
central bank, are independent of the monetary rule chosen. Morris and Shin (2005) have
recently argued that stabilization policy may have adverse eﬀects, if it reduces the informational
content of prices. Here this concern does not arise, as the information in the price indexes
observed by consumers is independent of monetary policy (as seen in Lemma 1). A natural
extension of the model in this paper would be to introduce additional sources of noise in prices,
so as to make their informational content endogenous and sensitive to policy.
25Appendix
Random consumption baskets
At the beginning of each period, household i is assigned two random variables,  it and vit, independently
drawn from normal distributions with mean zero and variances, respectively, σ2
  and σ2
v. These variables
are not observed by the household. The ﬁrst random variable represents the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, the second is the sampling shock, that will determine the sample of ﬁrms visited by consumer
i. Consumers and producers are then randomly matched so that the density of producers of type  it
matched to consumers of type vjt is given by φ( it,v jt),w h e r eφ is a bivariate joint normal density,
with covariance matrix
∙
σ2
 
√
γσvσ 
.σ 2
v
¸
,w h e r eγ ∈ [0,1]. Since the variable vit has no direct eﬀect on
payoﬀs I can normalize its variance and set σv =
√
γσ .
Let the sets Jit and ˜ Jit be deﬁned as in the text. Given the matching process described above the
following properties follow. The distribution { jt : j ∈ Jit} is a normal N
¡
vit,(1 − γ)σ2
 
¢
.T h a ti s ,t h e
average productivity innovation for the goods observed by consumer i is
θit = θt + vit.
The distribution
n
vjt : j ∈ ˜ Jit
o
is a normal, N
¡
γ it,γ(1 − γ)σ2
 
¢
.
Throughout the paper, I use the following notation:
σ2
  =( 1 − γ)σ2
 ,
σ2
v = γ (1 − γ)σ2
 ,
where σ2
  is the variance of the productivity shocks across the goods in the basket of a given consumer
and σ2
v is the variance of the sampling shocks across the consumers purchasing from a given producer.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
The proof is split in four steps. First, I introduce price and demand indexes that apply in the linear
equilibrium conjectured. Second, I use them to characterize the individual optimization problem. Then,
Id e ﬁne and solve a ﬁxed point problem that gives the desired equilibrium. Finally, I turn to local
determinacy.
Price and demand indexes
Suppose that individual behavior is characterized by the linear rules (5) and (6). Individual optimization
implies that, given Cit, the consumption of good j by consumer i is:
Cijt =
µ
Pjt
Pit
¶−σ
Cit,
where Pit is the price index
Pit ≡
µZ
j∈Jit
P
1−σ
jt dj
¶ 1
1−σ
. (13)
Consider now producer i. Aggregating the demand for good i across all the consumers j ∈ ˜ Jit gives
Yit = DitP
−σ
it ,
where Dit is the demand index
Dit ≡
Z
j∈ ˜ Jit
P
σ
jtCjtdj. (14)
26The aggregate price index and aggregate output are, as deﬁned in the main text, pt =
R 1
0 pitdi and
yt =
R 1
0 citdi. Given (5) and (6) they are equal to
pt = µat−1 + φθθt + φsst,
yt = ψ0 + at−1 + ψθθt + ψsst,
where ψθ = ψ  + ψv.
Lemma 3 If individual prices and quantities are given by (5) and (6) then the price index for consumer
i and the demand index for producer i are equal to
Pit = Vp exp{pt + φθvit}, (15)
Dit = Vd exp{yt + σpt +( ψv + σφθ)γ it}, (16)
where Vp and Vd are constant terms equal to
Vp = exp{
1 − σ
2
φ
2
θσ2
 },
Vd = exp{
1
2
ψ
2
 σ2
  +
1
2
(ψv + σφθ)
2 σ2
v + σ
(1 − σ)
2
φ
2
θσ2
 }.
Proof. Given (5) the prices observed by consumer i are log-normally distributed, with mean
pt + φθvit and variance φ
2
θσ2
 , therefore,
Z
j∈Jit
P
1−σ
jt dj = e(1−σ)(pt+φθvit)+
(1−σ)2
2 φ2
θσ2
 ,
the price index is derived substituting this in (13). Using this result and expression (6), the demand
index for producer i, (14), can be written as
Dit = eyt+σptV σ
p
Z
j∈ ˜ Jit
eψ  jt+ψvvjt ¡
eφθvjt¢σ
dj.
Note that the distribution
n
vjt : j ∈ ˜ Jit
o
is normal with mean γ it and variance σ2
v. It follows that
Z
j∈ ˜ Jit
eψ  jt+ψvvjt+σφθvjtdj = e
1
2ψ2
 σ2
 e(ψv+σφθ)γ it+ 1
2(ψv+σφθ)2σ2
v.
Individual optimization
In the conjectured linear equilibrium the nominal interest rate is constant and equal to R = eρ.L e t
f ( it,v it,θ t) denote the joint density of the shocks  it, vit and θt. Let the prices of state-contingent
claims at (t,0) be
q(ωit)=g(θt)f ( it,v it,θt), (17)
where g (θt) ≡ exp
n
−(1 + µ)θt + 1
2 (1 + µ)
2 σ2
θ
o
(recall that ωit ≡ { it,v it,θt}).
Given the conjectures made about aggregate behavior the only state variables for the optimization
problem of the individual household are Mit and at−1. The problem can then be analyzed using the
Bellman equation
V (Mit,a t−1)= m a x
{P(st,θit)},{C(st,θit,θit)},
{Zit(ωit)},{Mit+1(ωit)}
Et
∙
logCit −
1
1+η
N
1+η
it + βV (Mit+1,a t)
¸
27subject to the constraints
Mit+1 (ωit)=RMit +( 1+τ)PitYit − PjtCit −
Z
Zit (˜ ωit)q (˜ ωit)d˜ ωit − Tt + Zit (ωit),
Yit = DitP
−σ
it ,
Yit = AitNit,
Pit = P (st,θ it),C it = C
¡
st,θ it,θit
¢
,
(15), (16).
where Et [.] represents the expectation formed at (t,0). Given the conjecture made about the equilibrium
Et [.] can be replaced by E[.|at−1].
From this problem I can derive the optimality condition for prices and consumption
Ei,(t,I)
∙
1+τ
PitCit
Yit −
σ
σ − 1
1
Ait
µ
Yit
Ait
¶η Yit
Pit
¸
=0 , (18)
Ei,(t,II)
∙
1
PitCit
− βR
1
Pit+1Cit+1
¸
=0 . (19)
where Ei,(t,I) [.] and Ei,(t,II) [.] denote the expectations of agent i at (t,I) and (t,II).G i v e n t h e
conjectured equilibrium, and given Lemma 1, they can be replaced, respectively, by E[.|st,θ it,a t−1]
and E
£
.|st,θ it,θit,a t−1
¤
.
By Lemma 3 all the random variables in the expressions above are log-normal, including the output
of ﬁrm i which is equal to Yit = P
−σ
it Dit. Rearranging and substituting in (18) and (19) gives
pit = κp +
η
1+ση
¡
Ei,(t,I) [dit] − ait
¢
+
1
1+ση
¡
Ei,(t,I) [pit + cit] − ait
¢
, (20)
pit + cit = κc + Ei,(t,II)
£
pit+1 + cit+1
¤
. (21)
where κp and κc are equal to
κp =
1
1+ση
(H (ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ) − ln(1 + τ)),
κc = −ρ + G(ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ),
where H and G are known functions which depend on the model parameters.
Let me show that the market for state-contingent claims clears and that nominal balances are
constant and equal to M. Suppose Mit = M. Let the portfolio of state-contingent claims be
Zit (ωit)=M − RM − (1 + τ)PitYit + PjtCit + Tt.
For each realization of the aggregate shock ˆ θt goods markets clearing implies that
ZZ¡
PitYit − PjtCit
¢
f
³
 it,v it,ˆ θt
´
d itdvit =0 .
Substituting the government budget constraint, this implies that: (1) the market for state-contingent
claims clears for each aggregate state θt,
Z
Zit (ωit)f
³
 it,v it,ˆ θt
´
d itdvit = −(R − 1)M − τ
Z 1
0
PitYit − Tt =0 ,
and (2) that the portfolio {Zit (ωit)} has zero value at date (t,0),
Z
Zit (ωit)q (ωit)dωit =
Z µZ
Zit (ωit)f
³
 it,v it,ˆ θt
´
d itdvit
¶
g (θt)dθt =0 .
28Substituting in the household budget constraint shows that Mit+1 = M.
Let me now check that the portfolio just described is optimal. The optimality condition for a
security contingent on ωit can be written as
∂V (M,at)
∂Bit
f (ωit)=
Z
q (ωit)
∂V (M,at)
∂Bit
f (ωit)d˜ ωt.
Using the envelope conditions, this gives
E
∙
1
Pit+1Cit+1
|at−1,θ t
¸
f (ωit)=q (ωit)
Z
E
∙
1
Pit+1Cit+1
|at−1,˜ θt
¸
dF
³
˜ θt
´
.
Substituting equilibrium prices and consumptions (5)-(6), and the security prices (17), I obtain
e−(1+µ)θt = g (θt)E
h
e−(1+µ)˜ θt
i
,
which is satisﬁed, given the deﬁnition of g.
Fixed point
To check optimality substitute the conjectures made for individual behavior (5) and (6) in the optimality
conditions (20) and (21). Notice that all the shocks are i.i.d. so the expected value of all future shocks
is zero. Let βθ,βs and δ ,δη,δs be coeﬃcients such that
E[θt|θit,s t]=βθθit + βsst,
E
£
θt|θit,θit,s t
¤
= δ θit + δvθit + δsst,
and deﬁne
δθ ≡ δ  + δv.
Deﬁning the precision of the generic random variable x as πx ≡
¡
σ2
x
¢−1 the coeﬃcients βθ,βs and
δ ,δη,δs are
βθ =
π 
πθ + π  + πe
,β s =
πe
πθ + π  + πe
, (22)
δ  =
π 
πθ + π  + πv + πe
,δ v =
πv
πθ + π  + πv + πe
,δ s =
πe
πθ + π  + πv + πe
. (23)
Using the law of iterated expectations one can replace Ei,(t,I) [pit + cit] on the right hand side of
(20) with κc + Ei,(t,I)
£
pit+1 + cit+1
¤
. Substitute the conjectures (5) and (6) on both sides of (20) and
(21). Matching the coeﬃcients for θit,θit and st gives the conditions
(1 + ση)φθ = η((ψθ + σφθ)βθ − 1+( ψv + σφθ)γ (1 − βθ)) + (1 + µ)βθ − 1, (24)
(1 + ση)φs = η((ψθ + σφθ)βs + ψs + σφs − (ψv + σφθ)γβs)+( 1+µ)βs, (25)
ψ  =( 1 + µ)δ , (26)
ψv =( 1 + µ)δv − φθ, (27)
ψs =( 1 + µ)δs − φs, (28)
and matching the constant terms gives
0=−ln(1 + τ)+H (ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ)+l nVd +( 1+η)ψ0, (29)
0=−ρ + G(ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ). (30)
29The value of ψ  is immediately given by (26). Conditions (24)-(28) give the following values for φθ
and φs,
φθ =
η((1 + µ)δθβθ − 1) + (1 + µ)βθ − 1+η(1 + µ)δvγ (1 − βθ)
1+ση − η(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ))
, (31)
φs =
1
1+η
{η ((1 + µ)δθ +( σ − 1)φθ)βs + η(1 + µ)δs +( 1+µ)βs (32)
−η((1 + µ)δv +( σ − 1)φθ)γβs}.
Note that a solution for φθ exists since
1+ση − η(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ)) ≥
1+ση − η(σ − 1) > 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows since βθ ≤ 1 and γ ≤ 1. Substituting in (27)-(28) gives ψv and ψs.
Finally, substituting ψ ,ψv,ψs, and φθ in (29)-(30) gives ψ0 and ρ.
Local determinacy
Let variables with a tilde denote deviations from the equilibrium derived above. A ﬁrst order approxi-
mation of the optimality conditions gives
Ei,(t,I)
∙
˜ pit −
η
1+ση
˜ dit +
1
1+ση
³
e pit +˜ cit
´¸
=0 ,
Ei,(t,II)
h
e pit +˜ cit +˜ rt −e pit+1 − ˜ cit+1
i
=0 .
Taking expectations at time (T,0) and integrating across agents, in that order, gives
ET
∙
˜ pt −
η
1+ση
˜ dt +
1
1+ση
(˜ pt +˜ yt)
¸
=0 ,
ET [˜ pt +˜ yt +˜ rt − ˜ pt+1 − ˜ yt+1]=0 , (33)
for all t ≥ T.S i n c e˜ dt =˜ yt + σ˜ pt the ﬁrst condition implies that ET [˜ yt]=0 . Moreover, notice that
˜ rt = rt − ρ and ˜ pt = pt − p∗
t. Therefore, under the policy rule (3)
˜ rt = ξ˜ pt−1 for all t ≥ T.
Substituting these conditions in (33) and letting ht = ET [˜ pt] gives the following diﬀerence equation for
ht:
ht+1 − ht − ξht−1 =0for all t ≥ T
with hT−1 =˜ pT−1. The assumption ξ>1 ensures that any hT−1 6=0gives an explosive solution.
This shows that any equilibrium in a neighborhood of the original equilibrium must display pt = p∗
t for
all realizations of the aggregate shocks. Using this result one can show that the individual prices and
consumption are the same as under the original equilibrium.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
In the text.
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Under full information βθ = δ  = δv =0and βs = δs =1 . Substituting in (31)-(32) gives
φθ = −
1+η
1+ση − η(σ − 1)γ
,
φs =
η(σ − 1)
1+η
φθ (1 − γ)+1+µ.
Next, (26)-(28) give
ψ  =0 ,
ψv = −φθ,
ψs =1 + µ − φs =
= −
η(σ − 1)
1+η
φθ (1 − γ),
Finally, ψ0 can be determined from (29). Notice that only φs depends on µ. The real equilibrium
allocation only depends on the consumption levels cit a n do nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c e spit −pt,a n d ,g i v e n( 5 )
and (6), these are independent of φs. To conclude the proof, notice that
ψθ + ψs = −φθ −
η(σ − 1)
1+η
φθ (1 − γ)=1 .
The next lemma compares the full information equilibrium with a ﬁrst-best benchmark.
Lemma 4 There is a τ∗ such that the equilibrium under full information replicates the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation.
Proof. Given that there is no capital the ﬁrst-best allocation can be derived period by period
solving the problem
max
{Cijt}{Nit}
Z 1
0
µ
lnCit −
1
1+η
N
1+η
it
¶
di
s.t. Cit =
µZ
Jit
C
σ−1
σ
ijt dj
¶ σ
σ−1
∀i,
Z
˜ Jit
Cjitdj = AitNit ∀i.
The ﬁrst order conditions can be re-arranged to obtain
C
1
σ−1
it C
− 1
σ
ijt = λjt for each i ∈ [0,1] and each j ∈ Ji,
Aitλi = N
η
it for each i, (34)
where λjt is the Lagrange multiplier on the j-th resource constraint. Since the problem is concave these
conditions are suﬃcient for an optimum.
Let τ∗ be the τ that satisﬁes 1+τ∗ = σ
σ−1. Consider the equilibrium allocation arising under full
information, let
λjt =
Pjt
PjtCjt
.
31With full information the Euler equation (19) implies that PjtCjt is constant across agents. The demand
for good j by consumer i is given by Cijt = P
σ
itP
−σ
jt Cit. These two facts imply that
C
1
σ−1
it C
− 1
σ
ijt =
Pjt
PitCit
=
Pjt
PjtCjt
= λjt.
Moreover, under full information the optimal pricing condition (18) gives
1
PitCit
=
1
Ait
1
Pit
N
η
it,
which can be rearranged to give (34). Therefore, the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
conditions of the problem.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
For the following derivations recall that under imperfect information all the coeﬃcients βθ,βs,δ ,δv,δs
are in (0,1) and γ ∈ [0,1].
Diﬀerentiating (31) with respect to µ gives
∂φθ
∂µ
=
ηδθβθ + βθ + ηδvγ (1 − βθ)
1+ση − η (σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ))
> 0. (35)
To prove the inequality notice that the numerator is positive as it involves all non-negative terms and
βθ > 0. The denominator is positive since
βθ + γ (1 − βθ) ≤ 1,
and
η(σ − 1) ≤ ησ,
(since η ≥ 0), and these two inequalities imply
ση ≥ η(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ)).
Diﬀerentiating (32) gives
∂φs
∂µ
=
1
1+η
{η
µ
δθ +( σ − 1)
∂φθ
∂µ
¶
βs + βs + ηδs
− η
µ
δv +( σ − 1)
∂φθ
∂µ
¶
γβs} > 0. (36)
The inequality follows since γ ≤ 1 and δv <δ θ imply that
µ
δθ +( σ − 1)
∂φθ
∂µ
¶
− γ
µ
δv +( σ − 1)
∂φθ
∂µ
¶
> 0.
Recall that ψθ = ψv + ψ , then substituting (26) and (27) and diﬀerentiating gives
∂ψθ
∂µ
= δθ −
∂φθ
∂µ
> 0.
To prove this inequality I need to prove that
δθ >
ηδθβθ + βθ + ηδvγ (1 − βθ)
1+ση − η(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ))
,
32where I am using (35). Dividing by δθ on both sides and rearranging this is equivalent to
1+ση − η(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ)) >
βθ
δθ
+ ηβθ + ηδvγ (1 − βθ),
and this follows from the following two inequalities
1 >
βθ
δθ
,
and
ση − η[(σ − 1)(βθ + γ (1 − βθ)) + βθ + δvγ (1 − βθ)] >
= ση
∙
1 −
∙
βθ +
µ
1 −
(1 − δv)γ
σ
¶
(1 − βθ)
¸¸
> 0.
Diﬀerentiating (28) gives
∂ψs
∂µ
= δs −
∂φs
∂µ
< 0.
To prove the inequality notice that (36) implies
∂φs
∂µ
≥
βs + ηδs
1+η
and
βs + ηδs
1+η
>δ s.
Some lengthy but straightforward algebra, together with the inequalities derived above, can be used to
show that
δθ + δs >
∂φθ
∂µ
+
∂φs
∂µ
,
which proves the last statement.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
To prove the statement it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a µ and a vector {ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ,φ s} that satisfy (24)-(28)
and such that ψ  + ψv =1and ψs =0 .L e tm es e t
φ
fs
θ =
η + ηγ δv
δθ + 1
1−βθ
³
1 −
βθ
δθ
´
ησ + ηγ
³
σ − δ 
δθ
´
+ 1
1−βθ
³
1 −
βθ
δθ
´, (37)
and set the following values for the remaining variables
µfs =
1+φ
fs
θ
δθ
− 1, (38)
φ
fs
s = η
³³
1+σφ
fs
θ
´
βs −
³¡
1+µfs¢
δv +( σ − 1)φ
fs
θ
´
γβs
´
+
¡
1+µfs¢
βs, (39)
ψ
fs
  =
¡
1+µfs¢
δ ,
ψ
fs
v =
¡
1+µfs¢
δv − φ
fs
θ ,
ψ
fs
s =
¡
1+µfs¢
δs − φ
fs
s .
33Checking that ψ
fs
  +ψ
fs
v =1is straightforward (recall that δθ = δ  +δv). To check that ψ
fs
s =0I need
to check the following equality:
¡
1+µfs¢
δs = η
³³
1+σφ
fs
θ
´
βs −
³¡
1+µfs¢
δv +( σ − 1)φ
fs
θ
´
γβs
´
+
¡
1+µfs¢
βs.
Substitute µfs from (38) in this expression. Rearranging terms, this gives
φ
fs
θ =
η + ηγδv
δθ + 1
δθ
βs−δs
βs
ησ + ηγ
³
σ − δ 
δθ
´
+ 1
δθ
βs−δs
βs
.
To check that this expression is identical to (37) it suﬃces to show that
βs
1 − βθ
=
βs − δs
δθ − βθ
.
After some lengthy manipulation of the inference coeﬃcients, one can show that both sides of this
equation are equal to
σ2
θ
σ2
θ+σ2
e.
Finally, I can check that these values satisfy the equilibrium conditions (24)-(28). Conditions (26)-
(28) follow immediately from the deﬁnitions of
n
ψ
fs
  ,ψ
fs
v ,ψ
fs
s
o
. Substituting ψ
fs
θ =1 , ψ
fs
s =0 ,a n d
ψ
fs
v =
1+φ
fs
θ
δθ
δv − φ
fs
θ ,
in (24)-(25) gives me the expressions (37)-(39). This conﬁrms that also (24) and (25) are satisﬁed.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
First, using the household’s optimality condition I will derive necessary conditions for the coeﬃcients
{ψ t,ψvt,ψst,φ θt}. Next, I will show that under the appropriate choice of µt and ρt the same coeﬃcients
arise in equilibrium and induce the same real allocation.
The consumer Euler equation can be derived as in Proposition 1, and, using the law of iterated
expectations, can be written as
pit + cit = κc,t + Ei,(t,II)
£
Et+1
£
pit+1 + cit+1
¤¤
.
Since all idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d.
Et+1
£
pit+1 + cit+1
¤
= φ0,t+1 + ψ0,t+1.
Moreover, recall that φ0,t+1 and ψ0,t+1 are linear functions of the variables in ht+1 = hθt,e t,θt−1,e t−1,...i.
Therefore, it is possible to ﬁnd a vector
©
ζt+1,ξs,t+1,ξθ,t+1
ª
such that
φ0,t+1 + ψ0,t+1 = ζt+1 · ht + ξs,t+1st + ξθ,t+1θt.
Using the optimality conditions (20) and (21) one can proceed as in the proof of Proposition 1 and
show that the coeﬃcients
©
φs,t,φ θ,t,ψ ,t,ψv,t,ψs,t
ª
must satisfy the following set of conditions
(1 + ση)φθ,t = η
¡¡
ψθ,t + σφθ,t
¢
βθ − 1+
¡
ψv,t + σφθ,t
¢
γ (1 − βθ)
¢
+ ξθ,t+1βθ − 1,
(1 + ση)φs,t = η
¡¡
ψθ,t + σφθ,t
¢
βs + ψs,t + σφs,t −
¡
ψv,t + σφθ,t
¢
γβs
¢
+ ξθ,t+1βs,
ψ ,t = ξθ,t+1δ ,
ψv,t = ξθ,t+1δv − φθ,t,
ψs,t = ξθ,t+1δs − φs,t.
34This shows that the parameter ξθ,t+1 uniquely pins down the coeﬃcients
©
φs,t,φ θ,t,ψ ,t,ψv,t,ψs,t
ª
in
period t.S e t
µt = ξθ,t+1 − 1
one can proceed as in the proof of Proposition 1, show that this choice of µt delivers the same coeﬃcients
φθ,t,ψ0,t,ψ ,t,ψv,t,ψs,t, and derive the value of ρt consistent with µt.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Using the demand index Dit deﬁned in (16), the equilibrium labor supply of consumer i is given by
Nit =
DitP
−σ
it
Ait
= Vdect−ate(−1−σφθ+(ψv+σφθ)γ) it.
Substituting in the consumer utility function gives the per-period utility
cit −
1
1+η
V
1+η
d
³
ect−at−(1+σφθ−(ψv+σφθ)γ) it
´1+η
.
Taking expectations with respect to the idiosyncratic shocks  it and vit gives
yt −
1
1+η
V
1+η
d exp{(1 + η)ψ0 +( 1+η)(ψs + ψθ − 1)θt +( 1+η)ψset +
+
1
2
(1 + σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
2 (1 + η)
2 σ2
 }.
Taking expectations with respect to the aggregate shocks θt and et gives
Wt = ψ0 + at−1 −
1
1+η
V
1+η
d exp{(1 + η)ψ0 +
+
(1 + η)
2
2
³
(ψs + ψθ − 1)
2 σ2
θ + ψ
2
sσ2
e +( 1+σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
2 σ2
 
´
}.
Substituting the expression for Vd d e r i v e di nL e m m a3g i v e st h ee x p r e s s i o ni nt h eL e m m a .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
The policy problem is to choose a subsidy τ, an interest rate rule (µ,φθ,φ s,ρ,ξ), and equilibrium
coeﬃcients (ψ0,ψv,ψ ,ψs) that maximize Wt subject to the constraints (24)-(30). Notice that the
subsidy τ only appears in the constraint (29) and, for any value of the remaining variables, the constraint
(29) is satisﬁed by setting
τ =e x p{H (ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ)+l nVd (ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ)+( 1+η)ψ0} − 1.
A similar reasoning applies to ρ and constraint (30), while the choice of ξ has no eﬀects on the equilibrium
allocation. Therefore, the problem can be restated eliminating τ,ρ and ξ from the choice variables and
(29) and (30) from the constraints. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1 the constraints (24)-(28)
deﬁne a map between µ and (φθ,φ s,ψv,ψ ,ψs). This can be used to deﬁne a map w(µ) between µ and
the variable w deﬁned in (11). In short the policy problem can be stated as
max
µ,ψ0
ψ0 −
1
1+η
exp{(1 + η)
µ
ψ0 −
1
2
w(µ)
¶
}.
For any value of ψ0 the objective function in this problem is a monotone increasing function of w.
Therefore, the problem can be solved in two steps, ﬁrst setting µo =a r gm a x µ w(µ),a n dt h e nc h o o s i n g
ψ0 to maximize ψ0 − 1
1+η exp{(1 + η)
¡
ψ0 − 1
2w(µo)
¢
}.
35P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
Rearranging the constraints and substituting away the choice variable µ, the problem described in
Proposition 6 can be restated as
maxψθ,ψv,ψ ,ψs,φθ −(1 + η)
³
(ψθ + ψs − 1)
2 σ2
θ + ψ
2
sσ2
e
´
+ σ(σ − 1)φ
2
θσ2
 
−(1 + η)(1+σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
2 σ2
  +
−ψ
2
 σ2
  − (ψv + σφθ)
2 γσ2
 ,
subject to
(1 + ση)φθ = η((ψθ + σφθ)βθ − 1) + (ψθ + φθ)
βθ
δθ
− 1+η(ψv + σφθ)γ (1 − βθ), (40)
0=η(ψθ + σφθ)βs +( 1+η)ψs +( ψθ + φθ)
βs − δs
δθ
− η(ψv + σφθ)γβs (41)
ψ  =
ψθ + φθ
δθ
δ , (42)
ψv = ψθ −
ψθ + φθ
δθ
δ . (43)
It can be easily shown that the constraints (40)-(43) deﬁne a linear map that for each ψθ gives the
remaining choice variables, ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ. Moreover, Proposition 4 implies that the ﬁrst term in the
objective function is zero when ψθ =1 .
Therefore, to prove the statements in the proposition it is suﬃcient to study the properties of the
following function
f (ψθ) ≡− σ (σ − 1)φ
2
θ (1 − γ)+( 1+η)(1+σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
2 +
+ψ
2
  +( ψv + σφθ)
2 γ (1 − γ)
where ψ ,ψv,ψs,φ θ are those that satisfy the constraints (40)-(43). To derive this expression I have
used the fact that σ2
  =( 1− γ)σ2
 .
In particular, µfs is optimal if and only if f0 (1) = 0 and µo <µ fs if f0 (1) < 0.
The expression for f0 (ψθ) is given by:
f0 (ψθ)=2 {−σ (σ − 1)(1 − γ)φθ
dφθ
dψθ
+
+(1+η)(1+σφθ − (ψv + σφθ)γ)
µ
σ
dφθ
dψθ
− γ
µ
1
1+γ
−
γ
1+γ
dφθ
dψθ
+ σ
dφθ
dψθ
¶¶
+
ψ 
µ
1+
dφθ
dψθ
¶
γ
1+γ
+( ψv + σφθ)γ (1 − γ)
µ
1
1+γ
−
γ
1+γ
dφθ
dψθ
+ σ
dφθ
dψθ
¶
},
where
dφθ
dψθ
=
ηβθ +
βθ
δθ + ηγ(1 − βθ) 1
γ+1
ησ(1 − βθ) −
βθ
δθ − ηγ(1 − βθ)
³
σ −
γ
γ+1
´
+1
.
Setting ψθ =1 , it is possible to show that η ≥ 0 implies that the corresponding value for φθ satisﬁes
φθ ∈ [−1,0) and φθ =1only if η =0 . This property, together with the properties σ>1,βθ,δθ ∈
(0,1),βθ <δ θ and γ ∈ [0,1] can be used to show that: (i) f0 (1) > 0 if γ ∈ (0,1) and η>0, (ii)
f0 (1) = 0 in all remaining cases. The complete derivations are available from the author.
The next lemma shows that if µ ≤ µfs producers with higher productivity tend to set lower prices.
36Lemma 5 If ψθ ≤ 1 the response of prices to individual productivity is negative, φθ < 0.
Proof. By substitution one can show that φθ can be written as:
φθ = −
1 −
βθ
δθ ψθ + η(1 − βθψθ) − ηγ(1 − βθ)ψθ
³
1 − δ 
δθ
´
1 −
βθ
δθ + ησ(1 − βθ) − ηγ(1 − βθ)
³
σ − δ 
δθ
´ .
Notice that βθ <δ θ,β θ < 1,δ   <δ θ,σ>1 and γ ∈ (0,1). Therefore, the denominator of the fraction
on the right-hand side is positive, since
ησ(1 − βθ) ≥ ηγ(1 − βθ)
µ
σ −
δ 
δθ
¶
.
Moreover, if ψθ ≤ 1 then
η(1 − ψθβθ) ≥ ηγ(1 − βθ)ψθ
µ
1 −
δ 
δθ
¶
and the numerator is also positive.
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